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Boyd: Employment Law--Sex Discrimination--Fourth Circuit Holds Private

COMMENT
Circuit Holds
Disability
BenePrivate Employer's Denial of Pregnancy-Related
fits Sex Discrimination and Violative of Title VII. Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,423 U.S.
822 (1975).

EMPLOYMENT LAW-SEx DISCRIMINATION-Fourth

Appellees, female employees of Appellant General Electric,
brought a class action' seeking affirmative injunctive relief under
title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.2 Appellees contended that
General Electric's denial of pregnancy-related disability benefits'
constituted sex discrimination in violation of section 2000e-2(a)
of title VII and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) Guidelines 4 issued thereunder. The United States Dis1. Each of the original named plaintiffs was a G.E. employee who became pregnant
during 1971. Each made claims for sickness and accident (S & A) benefits which were
denied. Several of the plaintiffs filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and, upon waiting the requisite period, brought this suit with their local and
national unions, International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, Local 161,
and International Union of Electrical Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO-CLC, as coplaintiffs.
The original personal plaintiffs were representatives of two classes: all females who
were or had been employed by G.E. on or after September 14, 1971 or who became so
employed during the pendency of this action, and all female employees who became
pregnant and were denied S & A benefits or would be denied S & A benefits therefor from
September 14, 1971. The class numbered approximately 100,000 women employed at
hundreds of G.E. plant locations across the nation.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. II, 1972) provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
3. G.E. provided weekly nonoccupational S & A benefit payments to all its employees
in an amount equal to 60 percent of an employee's straight time weekly wage, to a
maximum benefit of $150 per week for each week the employee is unable to work because
of a disability resulting from a nonoccupational accident or sickness. The benefit payments could continue for a maximum total of 26 weeks for any one continuous period or
successive periods of disability due to the same or related cause. The coverage, however,
did not include sickness and other disabilities arising from pregnancy, miscarriage or
childbirth.
4. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9 (1975) provides in pertinent part:
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trict Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held that the denial
of pregnancy-related disabilities violated title VII and granted
Appellees the relief requested.' Upon appeal by General Electric,
the Fourth Circuit, with one judge dissenting, affirmed,' holding
that General Electric's exclusion of pregnancy-related disability
from its program was prohibited by title VII.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to ensure equality of employment opportunity, and specifically to
eliminate discrimination in employment based upon race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin.7 The EEOC was created by Congress to accomplish the purposes of the title and was empowered
to issue the guidelines necessary to end discriminatory practices.'
Pursuant to this authority, the EEOC has issued guidelines relat-

ing to sex discrimination, two of which are of critical importance
to an analysis of the issues presented in Gilbert.9 While agency
guidelines have usually been accorded great deference by the
court where the promulgating agency has been charged by Con(a) "Fringe benefits," as used herein, includes medical, hospital, accident, life
insurance and retirement benefits; profit-sharing and bonus plans; leave; and
other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.
(b) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate between men and women with regard to fringe benefits.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975) provides:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability
insurance or sick leave plan available in connection with employment. Written
and unwritten employment policies and practices involving matters such as the
commencement and duration of leave, the availability of extensions, the accrual
of seniority and other benefits and privileges, reinstatement, and payment
under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan, formal
or informal, shall be applied to disability due to pregnancy or childbirth on the
same terms and conditions as they are applied to other temporary disabilities.
5. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
6. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 822
(1975).
7. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-01 (1973); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). The legislative history pertaining to the
addition of "sex" is sparse. Apparently, the word was added to the language of the title
as a tongue-in-cheek gesture by a Southern Congressman whose apparent intent was to
undermine the title and bring about its defeat. See 110 CONG. REc. 2577-85 (1964).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1964).
9. For the content of the two guidelines pertinent here, see note 4 supra.In amending
the title in 1972, Congress made no substantive changes regarding sex discrimination,
which has been interpreted as an indication of Congressional satisfaction with the administration of the title by the EEOC. See Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199, 204
(3d Cir. 1975).
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gress to enforce a specific statute,10 the authority of the EEOC
guidelines in sex discrimination situations was substantially jeopardized by the Supreme Court's opinion in Geduldig v. Aiello."
In Aiello, four female plaintiffs' 2 brought an action challenging the constitutionality of a provision of the California disability
insurance program. That program provided benefits to private
employees temporarily disabled from working by an injury or
illness not covered by workmen's compensation," but excluded
from its coverage those disabilities which were pregnancyrelated.'" A three-judge district court upheld the plaintiffs' contentions.'5 The Supreme Court, after holding that a decision of a
California appellate court'" striking down the exclusion of abnormal pregnancies from the program rendered moot the claims of
the three plaintiffs who had suffered disability from other than
normal pregnancy and delivery,'" reversed as to the remaining
plaintiff, holding that California's decision not to insure the risk
of disability resulting from normal pregnancy does not constitute
an invidious discrimination violative of the Equal Protection
Clause.' 8 Stressing the legitimate concerns of the state in (1)
10. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
11. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
12. The plaintiffs-appellees, each of whom had paid sufficient amounts into the
State's Disability Fund to be eligible for benefits under the program, became pregnant
and suffered employment disabilities as a result of their pregnancies. The disabilities of
three of the appellees, Carolyn Aiello, Augustina Armendariz and Elizabeth Johnson, were
attributed to abnormal complications encountered during their pregnancies. The fourth,
Jacqueline Jaramillo, experienced a normal pregnancy, which was the sole cause of her
disability.
13. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 100 et seq. (West 1972). Under the provisions of the
California Act, employees contributed to an Unemployment Compensation Disability
Fund one percent of their salary up to an annual maximum of $85. No disability lasting
less than eight days was compensable, except when the employee was hospitalized. Benefits were not paid for a single disability exceeding twenty-six weeks. The only other
disabilities not compensable under the California program were those resulting from an
individual's court commitment as a dipsomaniac, drug addict or sexual psychopath, and
certain disabilities resulting from pregnancy.
14. The challenged provisions defined "disability" to exclude from coverage certain
disabilities resulting from pregnancy: "In no case shall the term 'disability' or 'disabled'
include any injury or illness caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the
termination of such pregnancy and for a period of 28 days thereafter." CAL. UNEMP. INS.
CODE § 2626 (West 1972).
15. See Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
16. Rentzer v. California Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 336 (1973).
17. 417 U.S. at 492.
18. In his opinion for a 6-3 majority, Justice Stewart stated:
We cannot agree that the exclusion of this disability from coverage amounts
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maintaining the self-supporting nature of its program, (2) adequately compensating those disabilities that are included rather
than inadequately protecting against all risks, and (3) maintaining a contribution rate not unduly burdensome on low-income
employees,"' Justice Stewart held:
These policies provide an objective and wholly noninvidious basis for the State's decision not to create a more
comprehensive insurance program than it has. There is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks insured by the
program worked to discriminate against any definable group or
class in terms of the aggregate risk protection derived by that
group or class from the program. There is no risk from which
men are protected and women are not. Likewise, there is no risk
from which women are protected and men are not.2 '
Although Aiello was decided upon Equal Protection grounds,
Justice Stewart, in responding to the dissent of Justice Brennan,
included language in a footnote which, although not essential to
the holding of the majority opinion, nevertheless provoked a
storm of controversy in the title VII area:
The dissenting opinion to the contrary, this case is thus a
far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) . . . and
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677. . . (1973) involving dis-

crimination based upon gender as such. The California insurance program does not exclude anyone from benefit eligibility
because of gender but merely removes one physical condition-pregnancy-from the list of compensable disabilities.
While it is true that only women can become pregnant it does
to invidious discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. California does
not discriminate with respect to the persons or groups which are eligible for
disability insurance protection under the program. The classification challenged
in this case relates to the asserted underinclusiveness of the set of risks that the
State has selected to insure ....

This Court has held that, consistently with

the Equal Protection Clause, a State "may take one step at a time, addressing
itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind
....
The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy
there, neglecting the others .

. . ."

Particularly with respect to social welfare

programs, so long as the line drawn by the State is rationally supportable, the
Courts will not interpose their judgment as to the appropriate stopping point.
"[Tihe Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose
between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all."
Id. at 494-95 (citations omitted).
19. Id. at 496.
20. Id. at 496-97.
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not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification like those considered in Reed
. . .and Frontiero . .

.

.Normal pregnancy is an objectively

identifiable physical condition with unique characteristics. Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere
pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against
the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage
of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with
respect to any other physical condition.
The lack of identity between the excluded disability and
gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear
upon the most cursory analysis. The program divided potential
recipients into two groups-pregnant women and non-pregnant
persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes ....11
Justice Brennan, writing for the dissent, assailed the majority's retreat from Reed and Frontiero, asserting that those cases
mandated stricter scrutiny than the "traditional" equal protection analysis where a state's legislative classification is genderbased.2" He argued that California's disability insurance program
established a double-standard, under which men are compensated for all disabilities and women are not." In support of his
argument, Justice Brennan cited the EEOC guidelines relating
to pregnancy disabilities and forcefully reasserted the plurality
holding in Frontiero, that "classifications based upon sex, like
classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are
inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict
judicial scrutiny." 4 Under such an analysis, he maintained, the
State had clearly failed to sustain its burden of showing that the
suspect classification served a compelling state interest.'
Although title VII was not mentioned in the Aiello majority
21. Id. n.20 (citations omitted).
22. Id. at 498.
23. Id. at 501. "Such dissimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical
characteristics inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination."

Id.
24. Id. at 503, (Brennan, J. dissenting), quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S.
677, 688 (1973).
25. Id. at 504. "[The State's interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its disability insurance program simply cannot render the State's use of a suspect classification
constitutional." Id. Especially is this true, the dissent concluded, where "California's
legitimate interest in fiscal integrity could easily have been achieved through a variety of
less drastic sexually neutral means." Id. at 505.
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opinion, several commentators, in light of the controversial language in footnote 20, have characterized the decision as a retreat
from the groundbreaking opinions in Reed and Frontiero and
have expressed concern about the possible effects of Aiello in
subsequent title VII litigation." Since the opinion in Aiello was
handed down, the Supreme Court has not rendered a decision on
the merits in a case involving denial of pregnancy-related disability benefits. 7 Thus there remains considerable confusion as to
what impact Aiello will have upon the validity of the EEOC
guidelines relating to pregnancy-related disability benefits. If, as
Justice Stewart remarked in footnote 20 of Aiello, a legislative
classification concerning pregnancy is not sex-based,2" then it
would seem that a private employer who excludes pregnancyrelated disability benefits from an employee insurance plan
would not be subject to an attack under title VII, since the statute
prohibits only discrimination based upon sex. Although the language of footnote 20 in Aiello was dictum, and Equal Protection,
not title VII, questions were at issue there, it is not clear that the
Supreme Court, when faced with a choice between the EEOC
guidelines and Justice Stewart's reasoning in Aiello, will necessarily adhere to the former. Since the Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in Gilbert,29 a resolution of the controversy engendered
by footnote 20 may be forthcoming.
In view of Gilbert and other recent circuit court opinions,30
it appears that at least the intermediate federal courts have had
little difficulty in disposing of the apparent conflict between
26. Bartlett, Pregnancyand the Constitution; The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CAL. L. REV.
1532 (1974); Erickson, Women and the Supreme Court: Anatomy Is Destiny, 41 BROOK.
L. REV. 209 (1974); Johnston, Sex Discriminationand the Supreme Court - 1971-74, 49
N.Y.U.L. REV. 617 (1974); Larson, Sex DiscriminationAs To Maternity Benefits, 1975
DUKE L.J. 805; Note, Waiting For The Other Shoe - Wetzel and Gilbertin The Supreme
Court, 25 EMORY L.J. 125 (1976); Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "HeightenedRationality
Test": Is the Supreme CourtPromotinga Double Standardin Sex DiscriminationCases?,
32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 275 (1975).
27. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 96 S.Ct. 1202 (1976) but vacated the circuit court's decision on the grounds
U.S. -,
that the district court's order was not appealable as a final decision under 28 U.S.C. §
1291, nor was it appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 as an interlocutory appeal.
28. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
29. 423 U.S. 822 (1975).
30. See, e.g., Holthaus v. Compton & Sons, 514 F.2d 651 (8th Cir. 1975); Communications Workers of America v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975); Wetzel
U.S.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated on othergrounds, ,96 S.Ct. 1202 (1976).
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Aiello and the EEOC guidelines. The Third Circuit, in Wetzel v.
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company," was the first circuit court
to be presented with the question of what impact Aiello should
have in a suit under title VII. Liberty Mutual maintained employment policies which excluded pregnancy benefits from the
company's income protection plan and required female employees to return to work within three months after childbirth or face
termination.12 Plaintiffs, female employees of the company,
brought a class action, 33 alleging that the company's employment
policies violated title VII. Relying primarily on Aiello, Liberty
Mutual argued that title VII did not require3 it
to include preg4
nancy benefits in the income protection plan.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Staley held Aiello was
not dispositive of the case, and could be distinguished on several
grounds: (1) the Equal Protection analysis of the sex discrimination in Aiello was inapposite to the title VII statutory analysis
that Wetzel presented; (2) Aiello involved public social welfare
interests under a state legislative program, not a private employer's policies with regard to its employees; and (3) the California program excluded only disability resulting from normal pregnancy, while Liberty Mutual excluded all pregnancy-related disabilities from its plan. 5 The court subsequently found Liberty
Mutual's plan defective, citing the EEOC guidelines and the deference to which they are entitled from the courts when not found
to conflict with congressional intent."
The court summarily rejected the company's argument that
pregnancy could be excluded from coverage because the disability
31. 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975).
32. Liberty Mutual, a national insurance underwriting business, provided its employees with an income protection plan. The plan was a fringe benefit and provided employees
with the payment of income during periods of disability. Funding of the plan was partially
through employee contributions. After an employee was out of work eight days because
of an illness requiring the care of a doctor, the employee received a percentage of his salary
for the duration of his leave. Liberty Mutual, however, did not pay any benefits under
the income protection plan for disability related to or caused by pregnancy. Leaves or
temporary absences due to pregnancy-related disabilities were not covered by the plan.
Id. at 203.
33. Named plaintiffs, Sandra Wetzel and Mari Ross, were employees of Liberty Mutual, and in this class action represented all female employees of defendant-appellant. Id.
at 201.
34. Id. at 203.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 204-05, citing Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 92-95 (1973), and
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
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is voluntary, whereas "illnesses" are not.3 ' Noting that Liberty
Mutual in fact covered other disabilities which resulted from
"voluntary" activities (e.g., drinking, smoking, skiing, etc.),
Judge Staley held that voluntariness was not a justification for
disparate treatment of pregnancy, especially in light of his doubts
that pregnancy is in fact voluntary. 8 The court also rejected the
company's argument that the plan covered only disabilities arising from sickness and that pregnancy is not a sickness." Judge
Staley was unable to distinguish disabilities due to pregnancy
from those arising out of illness, and held that Liberty's plan, if
so based, discriminated against women. 0 Equally ineffective in
the court's view was the company's contention that its plan was
not violative of title VII because of its legitimate interest in maintaining the financial integrity of the plan. Citing the EEOC
guidelines and the lack of statistical proof offered by the company, the court held that increased costs were not a defense to a
charge of sex discrimination. 4' Finally, the court held the company's mandatory maternity leave policies to be discriminatory
and invalid. 2
In Communications Workers of America v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,13 the plaintiff union brought a class action suit on behalf of all female employees and past female employees of defendant's Long Lines Department, alleging sex discrimination by the department for refusing to provide the same
37. 511 F.2d at 206. Except for pregnancy disabilities, Liberty Mutual purported to
include all other disabilities under its plan except those voluntarily inflicted. The court
noted, however, that some voluntary disabilities were in fact covered under the plan. Id.
38. Judge Staley elaborated:
Even if we were to accept appellant's argument of voluntariness, we find that
some voluntary disabilities are covered while one voluntary disability that is
peculiar to women is not so covered. Either way we find no support for appellant's argument. Moreover, pregnancy itself may not be voluntary. . . . This
court will not accept "voluntariness" as a reasonable basis for excluding pregnancy from appellant's income protection plan.

Id,
39. A woman, disabled by pregnancy, has much in common with a person
disabled by a temporary illness. They both suffer a loss of income because of
absence from work; they both incur medical expenses; and the pregnant woman
will probably have hospitalization expenses while the other person may have
none, choosing to convalesce at home.

Id.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 208.
379 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), rev'd, 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1975).
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rights, benefits and privileges to its female employees under temporary disability due to pregnancy or childbirth and resulting
complications, as are made available to its temporarily disabled
male employees. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint with leave to
replead for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted under title VII and certified to the Second Circuit the
question "whether Aiello has established . . . that disparity between the treatment of pregnancy-related and other disabilities
does not of itself constitute discrimination on the basis of sex (or
gender) within the prohibition either of Title VII or of the
Fourteenth Amendment."44
In answering this question45 in the negative, the Second Circuit ruled that Aiello did not require the conclusion reached by
the district court noting that
footnotes or other "marginalia" in Supreme Court opinions...
should be read "within the context of the holding of the court
and the text to which it is appended". . . . In view of the wide
differences between Aiello and the case at bar, these warnings
are particularly apposite here.46
Writing for the court, Judge Bryan further noted that footnote 20
of the Aiello opinion, upon which the district court primarily
relied, "deals with the constitutional validity of legislative classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, the standards of
judicial scrutiny to be applied in making such a determination,
and nothing more." 7 The court additionally emphasized that
nowhere in the Aiello majority opinion is title VII or the EEOC
guidelines mentioned. Moreover, Judge Bryan stated:
If, as the district court below thought, Aiello was a definitive holding that, absent mere pretext, disparity of treatment of
pregnancy-related disabilities could not constitute a violation of
Title VII, Aiello would substantially circumscribe the reach of
that Act of Congress and would invalidate the guidelines as to
44. 379 F. Supp. at 684.
45. On appeal, the Second Circuit rephrased the question presented by the district
court:
[Wihether Aiello required dismissal of the complaint in this action as a matter
of law for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted under Title
VII.
513 F.2d at 1027.
46. Id. at 1028 (citations omitted).
47. Id. at 1030.
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treatment of pregnancy disabilities issued by the EEOC. It is
inconceivable that the majority opinion intended so to hold
without even a mention of Title VII or the guidelines.48
In line with the Wetzel court, Judge Bryan noted that the statutory analysis under title VII of disparate treatment in private
employment is different from the constitutional analysis under
the Equal Protection Clause of disparate treatment in government employment. The court therefore held Aiello was not dispositive of the legality of the defendant's policies under title VII.w
Shortly after Wetzel and Communications Workers of
America were decided, the Fourth Circuit handed down its decision in Gilbert on June 27, 1975. Judge Russell, writing for a
divided court, followed a now familiar pattern of citing the EEOC
guidelines dealing with pregnancy-related disabilities and quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.5" for the proposition that such
guidelines are entitled to great deference from the courts. Further, the court noted, these guidelines are "merely expressive of
what is the obvious meaning and purpose of the Act."5 ' General
Electric argued that because the EEOC had initially indicated
that pregnancy benefits were not within the protection of the
statute, the Commission's present position that denial of
pregnancy-related benefits is sex discrimination constituted
"waffling" by the EEOC and courts should therefore give minimal weight to the guidelines.- The Fourth Circuit rejected this
argument, 3 which had been previously raised and rejected in
Wetzel." General Electric additionally argued, as had Liberty
Mutual in Wetzel," that exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from its benefit plan could not be deemed discriminatory
since its plan covered only sickness. Arguing that pregnancy is a
voluntary condition, General Electric maintained that confinement resulting from pregnancy could not be considered a sickness. In response, Judge Russell stated that such a defense was
inconsistent with the manner in which General Electric administered its program. He noted the fact that General Electric had
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1031.
50, 401 U.S. 424, 433M34.
51. 519 F.2d at 664-65, n.12.

52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 511 F.2d at 204-06.
55. Id. at 206.
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extended coverage to other disabilities which are essentially voluntary, and had raised the "voluntarism" defense only with respect to disability resulting from childbirth. Therefore, the court
determined, General Electric was precluded from relying upon
such an argument as a defense to a charge of sex discrimination."
General Electric, as had the earlier defendants, placed the
bulk of its defense squarely on the argument that Aiello had
conclusively established that disparity in treatment between
pregnancy-related and other disabilities is not sex discrimination
violative of either title VII or the Constitution. Following the lead
of the Second and Third Circuits, the court likewise rejected this
argument. In distinguishing A iello, Judge Russell relied upon the
premise that Aiello had involved a constitutional attack under
the Equal Protection Clause against a legislatively created social
welfare program, whereas the present case was one brought
against a private employer under title VII. Judge Russell noted
that Aiello had simply held that
a legislative classification incorporating a pregnancy-childbirth
classification was "rationally supportable" in a social welfare
program under the Fourteenth Amendment and that it did not
amount to an "invidious discrimination" under the Equal Protection Clause. 7
He further observed that the Aiello majority did not hold that
California's program was non-discriminatory, but simply held
such discrimination was not "invidious," and was "rationally
supportable."5 Judge Russell emphasized that in Gilbert the
issue was not "whether the exclusion of pregnancy benefits under
56. 519 F.2d at 665. Judge Russell wrote:
[Wlhether pregnancy disability was within the coverage offered by the plan

would be an issue that would turn largely on the construction of the plan as
followed by the defendant itself. The record appears clear that, other than for

childbirth disability, the defendant had never construed its plan as eliminating
all so-called "voluntary" disabilities. It has, as the District Court stated, applied its plan to "all disability, including cosmetic surgery, disabilities arising
from attempted suicides, etc." except those occurring during childbirth. In
short, the defendant raises this defense of "voluntarism" only against a disability that is unique to women and disregards it in connection with any claim for
disability submitted by male employees. Whatever facile plausability there
might be to the argument that its plan does not cover "voluntary" disabilities
accordingly disappears in the face of the manner in which the defendant itself
has construed and applied its plan.
Id.
57. Id. at 666.
58. Id. at 666-67.
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a social welfare program is 'rationally supportable' or'invidious'
but whether Title VII, the Congressional statute, in language and
intent, prohibits such exclusion.'' Distinguishing Equal Protection analysis from statutory construction he stated:
Title VII, however, authorizes no such "rationality" test in determining the propriety of its application. It represents a fiat
and absolute prohibition against all sex discrimination in conditions of employment. It is not concerned with whether the discrimination is "invidious" or not. It outlaws all sex discrimination in the conditions of employment."'
General Electric made no assertion based upon a bona fide occupational qualification, an exception to title VII's prohibition of
sex discrimination.' Thus, the court concluded that "[ilts denial of pregnancy-related disability from the application of its
employee disability benefit program. . . falls clearly within the
prohibitions of Title VII, and Aiello confers no immunity for such
denial." 2
In dissent, Circuit Judge Widener maintained Aiello was
controlling, despite the fact that it involved the Equal Protection
Clause and not title VII. He argued that the sanctions of title VII
only apply once there has been a finding of discrimination based
on sex, and that Aiello stands for the proposition that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disability from an employee disability
benefits program is not sex discrimination. Thus Judge Widener
asserted that the majority erroneously invoked the sanctions of
title VII against General Electric.63 Citing United States v. Ches59. Id. at 667.
60. Id.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.2(e) (1964) which reads in part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this subchapter, (1) it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees,
...on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin isa bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or
enterprise ....

The court erroneously treated the bona fide occupational qualification and the business necessity test, a second defense recognized in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971), as being synonymous and thus incorrectly asserted that business necessity
was the sole exception to the title VII prohibition. 519 F.2d at 667 & n.23.
The EEOC guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.9(e) (1975) state: "It shall not be a defense
under Title VII to a charge of sex discrimination in benefits that the cost of such benefits
is greater with respect to one sex than the other."
62. 519 F.2d at 667.
63. Id. at 668. Contrary to the majority opinion, Judge Widener interpreted Aiello as
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terfield County School District,4 he argued that the tests under
title VII and under the Equal Protection Clause are the same with
regard to discrimination in employment, especially in the Fourth
Circuit.15

Despite the relative ease with which the majority in Gilbert
disposed of Aiello, as had the Wetzel and Communications Workers of America courts previously, the ultimate disposition of these
cases remains seriously in doubt. The Supreme Court has not
dealt with this issue in a sex-discrimination case under title VII
since Aiello was decided, and it remains to be seen whether the
Court will adopt an analysis similar to that of Judge Russell in
Gilbert. Although a discussion of the Supreme Court's record in
sex discrimination cases is beyond the scope of this comment, it
has been noted by other commentators that the Court has not
been able to settle on a consistent approach to cases in this area. "
Further, the Court has not discussed the merits of a sexdiscrimination case in light of the EEOC's latest guidelines
(which weighed so prominently in the discussions of Gilbert and
holding that such an exclusion is not sex-based absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy were mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against
one sex, and that the plaintiffs in Gilbert had failed to make such a showing. He relied
upon the language of footnote 20 in Aiello to buttress this assertion, refusing to narrowly
limit that language as did the Second Circuit in Communications Workers of America:
Absent a showing of sex discrimination, Title VII, even if its reach were
broader than the equal protection clause, would not render unlawful a pregnancy exclusion such as that involved here. Since the Supreme Court has held,
for precisely the same exclusion, there is a "lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such," the exclusion should no more support a
finding of discrimination under Title VII than under the equal protection clause
... . [NIo reason appears why a collective bargaining agreement may not
lawfully do by contract what a state may do by legislation.
Id. at 668-69.
64. 484 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1973).
65. 519 F.2d at 669. To illustrate dissatisfaction with the different standards applied
by the majority, Judge Widener suggested the problem which would result where a stateoperated disability plan open to private employees excluded pregnancy benefits. The plan
would be upheld under the Equal Protection Clause, as a valid state disability insurance
program under Aiello, while a similar plan for state employees would be invalidated under
title VII. Judge Widener accused the majority opinion of espousing the view of the dissenters in Aiello, which he asserted was rejected pointedly in footnote 20. He also argued that
Aiello
was written with an eye to Title VII cases certain to come, not in a vacuum and
not with self-imposed blinders, and came to the only result possible when we
consider that the Court must be the even handed arbiter in all cases, not only
those involving equal protection.
Id.
66. See note 26 supra.
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Wetzel), nor in view of its holding in Aiello. There is also the
question of how the Court will treat the language of footnote 20
in Aiello, and particularly, whether it will so casually brush it
aside as did Judge Bryan in Communications Workers of
America. Although both the Gilbert and Wetzel opinions distinguished Aiello on the ground that constitutional analysis is unlike
statutory interpretation, it remains for the Supreme Court to
determine whether the test of validity under title VII is so different from the Fourteenth Amendment test as to justify the widelydivergent results in Gilbert and Wetzel, and Aiello. Many observers view Aiello as a retreat by the Court from its earlier stand on
sex-discrimination as exhibited by Reed and Frontiero.Y Since
Aiello was decided, the only decisions rendered by the Court in
the sex discrimination area have not clarified the confusion of
what standard is appropriate for review under the Equal Protection Clause, and none have dealt with the question of exclusion
of pregnancy-related benefits and the EEOC guidelines relating
thereto. "
Against a background as uncertain as this, the fate of Gilbert
as well as the EEOC guidelines, seems tenuous at best. Although
the opinion in Gilbertis persuasive, the dissent of Judge Widener
raises troubling questions, which hopefully will soon be resolved
by the Supreme Court. The law in the area of sex discrimination
is in a state of near chaos, and the result of the Supreme Court's
review of Gilbert could alleviate the confusion. The Court could
adhere to its holding in Aiello while nevertheless affirming
Gilbert." However, such a result would not yield any of the badly
needed consistency in the equal employment sphere which the
lower courts require. The proper solution would be a decision by
the court either to adhere to the language in footnote 20 of the
Aiello opinion and overrule the conflicting guidelines promulgated by the EEOC, or to overrule Aiello and uphold the interpretation of the Commission. If denial of pregnancy-related benefits
is sex discrimination, it should not be allowed to persist under the
67. See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974).
96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976) where the Court
U.S. -,
69. See Washington v, Davis, -

distinguished proof of racial discrimination in the title VII context from the analysis
appropriate under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clause. The court might adopt
similar reasoning in Gilbert, although the impact of Washington on the sex discrimination
area has not yet been determined.
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Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and if it
is not sex discrimination, employers should not be penalized for
employment policies which are valid under the Constitution.*
W. Howard Boyd, Jr.
*EDITOR'S NOTE: On December 7, 1976, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Gilbert. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 45
U.S.L.W. 4031 (1976).
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